Reversal of Fortune: How the German Courts Found Their Human Rights and Helped the European Courts Find Theirs by Biggs, Henry
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review 
Volume 21 
Issue 2 Volume 21 Issue 2 (Spring 2014) Article 3 
5-1-2014 
Reversal of Fortune: How the German Courts Found Their Human 
Rights and Helped the European Courts Find Theirs 
Henry Biggs 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, European Law Commons, and the Human Rights 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry Biggs, Reversal of Fortune: How the German Courts Found Their Human Rights and Helped the 
European Courts Find Theirs, 21 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 165 (2014) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol21/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative 
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more 
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu. 
REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: HOW THE GERMAN COURTS FOUND THEIR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HELPED THE EUROPEAN COURTS FIND THEIRS
Henry Biggs*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. ........ 165
II. EIGENTUM (PROPERTY): ARTICLE 14 OF THE GERMAN
GRUNDGESETZ ................................................ 172
A. GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT CASES ...... ........ 173
1. NASSAUSKIESUNG DECISIONS .................... 173
2. THE EIGENLEISTUNG CASE........... ............ 175
III. EUROPEAN CHARTERS ........................... ......... 175
A. FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN CHARTER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR) . ................ ......... 175
B. FORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .. .................. 178
IV. UNDERSTANDING PROCEDURE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS.........183
V. THE BOSPHORUS CASES...................................186
A. BOSPHORUS (ECJ) ...................... ........ 186
B. BOSPHORUS (ECTHR) .................... ............. 187
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................. 189
I. INTRODUCTION
The formation of the German Grundgesetz, or "Basic Law,"
after the Second World War, was steeped in a melting pot of political
and social forces dramatically different from those found in our
twenty-first century landscape. Indeed, even the choice of the term
Grundgesetz over Verfassung ("Constitution") was motivated by forces
unfamiliar to us today, viz., a West Germany hoping for an imminent
reunification with its Eastern half.1 Of primary influence at the time
* Henry Biggs, B.A., Harvard; PhD, UCLA; JD, Saint Louis University; Masters 2
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University in St Louis. I would like to thank first and foremost Professor Alan Wein-
berger of Saint Louis University for his patience, attention and helpful suggestions; Die
Ruhr Universittit-Bochum, Dr. Prof. Roman Seer, Dirk Schafers, Dr. Marcel Krumm,
and all the law students under Dr. Prof. Roman Seer's direction who provided
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were two political ideologies that took great stock in the human as
collective: (1) Totalitarianism, particularly as realized by Hitler's Third
Reich, its full dehumanizing horror searingly fresh in the minds of the
Grundgesetz drafters; 2 and (2) Communism, which effaced the indivi-
dual through its singly purposed celebration of the collective.3 The
drafters of the Grundgesetz were contrarily greatly fueled by a desire to
respond with an ideological exaltation of the individual and so set out
to enunciate the necessary basic human rights needed to realize that
vision.4
Over the next forty years, the resulting Grundgesetz text played
its fair part as a beacon against the westward creeping of Communism
and its success as a powerful expression of individual rights has led
politicians and scholars to an increased interest in arguing for their
constituents' ownership. German interests, for example, have often
argued the credit belongs to visionary German drafters who astutely
amended the mistakes of previous German Constitutional efforts;
American interests have contended the credit belongs rather to Allied
and particularly American legal and American constitutional
influences.5
encouragement and access to materials during my time in Bochum, Germany; to
Professor Matt Gabel and Dean Michael Peil of Washington University in St Louis for
invaluable comments; and finally to Dean Peter Cramer for his assistance proofing
German translations. All errors are my own. I would also like to thank the Saint Louis
University School of Law for the Bochum fellowship which led to this research.
I KURT RABL, CHRISTOPH STOLL & MANFRED VASOLD, VON DER AMERIKANISCHEN
VERFASSUNG zUM GRUNDGESETZ DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 138 (Verlag
Moos & partner eds., 1988).
2 GERHART HOFFMEISTER, KURT FRANK REINHARDT, FREDERIC C. TUBACH, FROM THE
NAzI ERA TO GERMAN UNIFICATION 116 (1992).
3 FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD REPORT 307 (Kevin Boyle & Juliet
Sheen eds., 1997). As stated "The 1949 Constitution (Basic Law or Grundgesetz) was
formed in a context dominated by two factors: first, as a reaction against the National
Socialist dictatorship and also against the liberal democratic Weimar Republic, and
second by its formation in the context of the Cold War. ... The German constitutional
order consequently perceives itself as not 'free of Imoral or ideologicall values'
("wertfrei"). Rather, the fundamental values of the new democratic order are to be
actively protected against threats from outside and within, whether moral or
ideological as well as military or physical." Id.
4 Id.
5 Among the Allied Forces-America, Britain and France-it is generally agreed that
the Americans had the strongest influence of the three due to their relative economic
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National biases likely play a part in these arguments, and the
truth likely, and more prosaically, lies somewhere in between. 6 To
health at the end of the war. For a table listing GDPs of all countries during and after
the war, see MARK HARRISON, THE ECONOMICS OF WORLD WAR 1110 (1998). Harrison
notes that in 1945 America had a GDP of $1474 (in billions), whereas the UK had a
GDP of $331, and France $101. Id. See also Tony Judt, The Past Is Another Country:
Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe, in THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION IN EUROPE:
WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH 294 (Istvin Deik, Jan Tomasz Gross & Tony
Judt, eds., 2000). As Judt states: "Western countries ... suffered terrible material loss-
during the fighting of 1944-45, France lost the use of some 75 percent of its harbors
and rail yards and half a million houses were damaged beyond repair. Even unoccupied
Britain is calculated to have lost some 25 percent of its entire prewar national wealth as
a result of the war." For a still further detailing of the economic, physical and
psychological devastation following the Second World War, see TONY JUDT,
POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 13-240 (The New York Press ed., 2005).
6 For a thorough summary of those supporting the various positions of Allied vs.
German involvement in the formation of the Grundgesetz, see EDMUND SPEVACK,
ALLIED CONTROL AND GERMAN FREEDOM: AMERICAN POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL
INFLUENCES ON THE FRAMING OF THE WEST GERMAN BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ) 13-
29 (GESCHICHTE SER. No. 36, 2001); see also CJ FRIEDRICH AND HJ SPIRO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC GOVERNING POSTWAR GERMANY
150 (1953). Those who have argued that Germany was handed its Constitution
effectively as a Diktat from the Allies have contended that the Germans involved at the
time were shells or fronts, termed as Lizenzdemokraten ("Licensed Democrats") or
"Er/ullungspolitker" ("Politcal Fulfillment Personnel"), puppets who presented a front
for the Constitution to appear to be German-made. Those supporting this position also
point to the compelling similarities between the American Constitution and the
Grundgesetz, for example the insertion of a basic list of human rights at the outset of
the document. SPEVACK, ALLIED CONTROL AND GERMAN FREEDOM at 26. See also
GERD EHRLICH, EINFLUSS DES ANGELSACHCHSISCHEN VERFASSSUNGSDENKENS AUF DIE
ENTSTEHUNG DES GRUNDGESETZES 40 (Klaus Stem ed., JAHRE GRUNDGESETZ, 23-31,
1990). On the other hand, for those in support of the contrary argument for German
influence, one can look at the manifest similarities of the Grundgesetz to previous
German Constitutional documents. Striking similarities can be seen when placing the
Weimar Constitution directly next to the Grundgesetz. The following example relates
to the language concerning Property:
Weimar Constitution, Art 153:
Das Eigentum wird von der Verfassung gewahrleistet. Sein Inhalt und seine Schranken
ergeben sich aus den Gesetzen ...Eigentum Verpflichtet. Sein Gebrauch soll zugleich
Dienst sein fur das Gemeine Beste. ["Property shall be guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. Its substance and limits arise from the laws. Property obliges. Its use should
also serve the Common Good."] [Author's Translation]. Grundgesetz fur die Bundes-
republik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. 14
(Ger.).
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argue that there was no Allied influence in face of the unconditional
German surrender and the extensive documentation of the close moni-
toring of the Grundgesetz formational meetings by the American Gen-
eral Lucius Clay is to ignore extensive documentation to the contrary.7
By the same token, to contend that Americans unilaterally drafted the
Grundgesetz while the Germans looked on is to deny principles and
exact language in the Grundgesetz that harken to former German
Constitutions and bespeak a thoughtful German presence in the
drafting.8
Regardless, the overarching desire to stand in principled
contrast to the idea of the philosophies of the collective was clearly a
driving force in the Grundgesetz' formation, and the drafters ultimately
settled on the overarching principle of Human Dignity (Menschen-
wfirde) to serve as the core principle. From this bedrock principle, the
drafters enunciated a series of fundamental rights that would protect
14(1) Das Eigentum wird von der Verfassung gewahrleistet. Sem Inhalt und seine
Schranken werden durch die Gesetze bestimmt.
14(2) Eigentum verpflichtet. Sein Gebrauch soll zugleich dem Wohle der
Allgemeinheit dienen.
["Property shall be guaranteed by the Constitution. Its substance and limits are defined
through the laws. Property obliges. Its use should also serve for the well-being of the
community"] [Author's Translation].
A counter-argument to this example of German legal theory in turn might fairly be put
forth that the Weimar Constitution itself does not constitute true German thinking in
that it was heavily influenced by the victors of the First World War, but the parallel is
nonetheless striking. For an analysis of the Allies influence upon the Grundgesetz and
of all of the positions relating to influences on the Grundgesetz, see SPEVACK, ALLIED
CONTROL AND GERMAN FREEDOM at 16-26.
For example, Lucius Clay's advocacy for greater Linder (state) rights in the German
federation, see DIETRICH ORLOW, COMMON DESTINY: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE
DUTCH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, 1945-1969 85 (2000);
for perspectives on the genesis of the Basic Law, see also SPEVACK, supra note 7, at
13-26.
If indeed the drafting involved collaboration between the Allied parties and the
Germans, some have suggested further that the Allied forces, and particularly the
Americans, may have been more eager for this to appear to be the case than for it to
actually be the case. For more on this point of view, see Edmund Spevack, American
Pressures on the German Constitutional Tradition: Basic Rights in the West German
Constitution of 1949, 10 INT'L J. POL., CULTURE, & Soc'Y 411-36 (1997).
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that human dignity and provide individuals with the basic needs that
would enable them to flourish as such.9
These enunciated rights, however, often came with something
of a twist-an accompanying duty, sometimes explicit, to the
individual's undergirding duty to preserve this individual right by,
ironically, a commitment to his collective, i.e., the State. That duty was
distinct from the American version of inalienable rights in that the
purpose was not to enunciate an absolute freedom from government
intrusion, but rather a relative freedom that balanced government and
larger community interests in its calculus.10
Perhaps nowhere has this balance between the State and the
individual been more uniquely developed in German constitutional
law than in Article 14 of the Grundgesetz relating to Property
("Eigentum") and the accompanying Social Duty ("Sozialbindung" or
"Sozialpflicht") articulated by the German Constitutional Courts
("BundesVerfassungsGericht" or "BVerfG"). 11 As developed over the
9 GERT-JOACHIM GLAESSNER, GERMAN DEMOCRACY: FROM POST-WORLD WAR II TO
THE PRESENT DAY 21 (2005).
10 Rainer Arnold, A Fundamental Rights Charter for the European Union, 15/16 TUL.
EUR. & Civ. L. F. 43, 45 (2000-2001). Arnold stated specifically that "[t]he end of the
Second World War opened a new era in European constitutional thinking. The general
trend through various phases is a transition from state orientation towards a more
anthropocentric approach: the dignity of man is conceived as the highest and most
sacred value at the top of each constitutional order. On this basis an effective
fundamental rights protection evolves, often institutionally backed by a constitutional
court. New instruments such as recognition of the principle of proportionality as a
limitation on state intervention into the individual's sphere and the guarantee of
fundamental rights (starting from the German "Wesensgehaltsgarantie" laid down in
Article 19 of the German Basic law of 1949) become common in European Constitu-
tional Law in the second half of the twentieth century. State power as well as
supranational power concentrate on the welfare of the individual."
As noted in von Minch's Grundgesetz Kommentar:
Art. 14 gewihrIleistet Eigentum und Erbrecht. "Als verfassungsrechtliche Aussage
uber die Eigentumsordnung ist die Vorschrift von zentraler Bedeutung fur die Stellung
des einzelnen im Staat undfur die Gesellschaftsordnung insgesamt. Es ist daher nicht
erstaunlich, daf3 dieser Artikel und seine Auslegung in der gesamten Geschichte der
Bundesrepublik im Zentrum politischer Auseindersetuzungen um die Gestaltung der
Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsordnung gestanden hat und noch steht. ["Art. 14:
Guaranteed Property and inheritance. As a legal constitutional statement concern-
ing property law, the regulation is of central significance for both the position of the
individual within the State and for the order of the community overall. It is therefore
2014 1 69
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years, the concept broadly described is that German property identical
in nature may carry different compensatory obligations from the State,
depending on that property's centrality to that owner's "Human
Dignity" needs. If that property serves as a person's only means, it
carries necessarily a greater compensatory obligation from the State
than the same property owned by a speculative real estate developer.
Furthermore, that property's monetary value may be counter-balanced
by the criticality of the need enunciated by the state -the threatening
of a city's water resources, for example, will weigh more against the
individual property owner's degree of compensation than, say, the
State's desire to build a road that may or may not absolutely need to
run across one's land.12
While Germany's notion of Sozialbindung offers a unique
tension between private rights and public interest in property, it was
not the only effort of the time to work toward enunciating such a
tension. The drafters of the European Charter of Human Rights
(ECHR) also wrestled contemporaneously with the idea of property as
a core human right, trying to balance the needs of the individual with
differing national ideas of the role of the collective. Language that
would not alienate socialist countries proved a crucial and nettlesome
task. While the drafters did not want to allow for indiscriminate
takings by the government, they also did not want to eliminate any
possibility for governments to expropriate land if it served the
common interest.13 The final articulation and balancing of this property
not surprising that throughout the entire history of the Federal Republic of Germany,
this Article and its interpretation have been and still are at the center of political
debates relating to the formation/creation/design of the Economic and Society Order."]
[Author's Translation]. GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR: BAND 1 PRAAMBEL. ART 1-19,
884(2000).
12 See Nassauskiesung, BVerfG, BVerfG 1981 58 BVerfGE 300 (F.R.G) and infra III, 1.
13 A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLs, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (3d ed. 1993). As stated by Robertson
and Merrills regarding the necessary attention to socialist countries: "any clause
designed to guarantee the enjoyment of possessions would not be acceptable to
socialist governments unless it was made quite clear that this would not prevent the
State from nationalizing private property." Id.
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right indeed proved enough of a challenge that it was not included
among the ECHR's first Articles.14
Over the long term this effort to balance the needs of the
collective and the individual in articulating property rights would also
come to play a role for The Charter of the European Union (EU), dev-
eloped soon after the Second World War as well, but initially con-
ceived for economic recovery purposes only. In terms of defining
property rights from a human rights perspective or enunciating
human rights generally, the EU would entirely neglect to articulate
them in its founding Charter, focusing myopically, but perhaps
understandably, on its economic mission. Over the next fifty years this
lacuna would cause headaches for the EU, and particularly its judicial
arm, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Addressing the issue with
patchwork jurisprudential efforts, the absence of a clearly defined
property right would finally be more satisfactorily addressed by a fully
articulated and codified Charter of Fundamental Rights under the ECJ,
ratified in 2010 by the Treaty of Lisbon. Ultimately, it is the curious,
and at times counterintuitive, interplay of these three legal perspec-
tives, each in its own way wrestling with collective and individual
needs as seen through property rights, that will be the focus of this
paper.
We will begin with a deeper analysis of the unique approach
to property ownership as understood through Article 14 of the
Grundgesetz, particularly the social duty (Sozialbindung) inherent in
Article 14. In Part II, our focus will turn to how the German notion of
Property, as defined through Article 14 of the Grundgesetz, has been
articulated through case law in the German Constitutional Court
("BundesVerfassungsGericht" or "BVerfG"). In Part III, we will move to
the notion of property as it has been articulated in the European
Courts, specifically, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Part IV will take a closer look at
procedure of the supra-national courts and address how that proce-
dure offers a particularly powerful opportunity for the ECJ, a court
with an economic focus, to influence the ECtHR in its human rights
decisions. Finally, Part V will take an applied look at that process,
14 They settled instead on including Property the following year in the Charter's First
Protocol. Id.
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analyzing the Bosphorus case to better understand the interplay
between the two supranational courts, the ECJ and the ECtHR, as they
address fundamental human rights issues.
II. EIGENTUM (PROPERTY): ARTICLE 14 OF THE GERMAN GRUNDGESETZ
As enunciated in Article 14(1) of the Grundgesetz, "[p]roperty is
guaranteed by the Constitution."15 As that Article articulates immedi-
ately thereafter, however, and somewhat incongruously, the limit of
that property right is ultimately delineated by the government and its
legislature: "Its [property's] content and boundaries will be defined by
law." 16 Furthermore, Article 14(1) follows with an explicit statement of
a duty to the community of property ownership: "Its use should at the
same time serve the welfare of the Community."17
As analyzed by the German Constitutional Courts, this
approach to property ownership vests property rights of individuals in
relation to how central that property right is to their ability to realize
their human potential-in short, in subjective rather than objective
terms.18 This subjective judgment does not relate only to the indivi-
dual's property interest. As stated earlier, the importance of the State's
interest also enters into the German court's compensatory calculus, as
it is understood that the German Government must in turn show it has
a community need or interest it is trying to meet that is truly com-
pelling.19
This notion of a sliding scale of compensation is foreign to U.S.
Constitutional understandings of property, which strive to compensate
real property more objectively through the Takings Clause, without
entering into any subjective questioning of the centrality of the
1s Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law],
May 23, 1949, BGBl. 14(1) (Ger.) [Author's translation].
16 Id. [Author's translation].
17 Id. [Author's translation].
18 Rebecca Lubens, The Social Obligation of Property Ownership: A Comparison of
German and US. Law, 24 ARIZ J. INT'L & COMP. L. 389, 393 (2007). Lubens goes on
to say: "The German State under the Basic Law ... is authorized to pursue a "socially
just property order" by balancing individual freedom against the interests of the
general welfare, and German courts regularly refer to this affirmative duty of the
property owner and of the state."
Grundgesetz, supra note 16, at art. 14(2).
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property to the owner's real needs.20 How this German right functions
is perhaps best seen in several cases of particular notoriety, which we
will focus on in the next section.
A. German Constitutional Court Cases
1. Nassauskiesung Decisions
In the Nassauskiesung (Gravel Mining) decisions, a gravel
business concern claimed a recent law that had been passed constitu-
ted a Taking in that it prevented them from using the water that the
gravel company had been using, which flowed under its own proper-
ty. 21 While the German Supreme Civil Court ruled in favor of the
company for compensation, the Bundesverfassungsgericht disagreed,
stating that when the issue related to "vital public resources" such as
water, there was no right that had been taken and no compensation
was therefore due.22 The Bundesverfassungsgericht held further that the
challenged law had appropriately defined the limits ("Schranken") of
individual property rights, and thus related to Article 14(1), with the
consequence that no compensation to the individual, as defined under
14(3), would be required.23
20 As Lubens states: "German courts have interpreted the social obligation
(Sozialpflicht) in Article 14, the property clause of the German Constitution, to justify
more extensive land-use regulation than U.S takings jurisprudence allows." Lubens,
supra note 19, at 392.
2 1 Id. at 409.
22 "Bei einem knappen Gut, das ... fLir die Allgemeinheit von lebenswichtiger
Bedeutung ist, wiire eine solche Regelung unvertretbar." [With a scarce resource that is
of vital importance to the general public, such a regulation would be unacceptable.]
[Author's Translation]. BVerfGE 58, 300 - NaBauskiesung 201, available at
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/ bv058300.html#Rn210.
23 Art. 14(3) states:
"Eine Enteignung ist nur zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit zulassig. Sie darf nur durch
Gesetz oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes erfolgen, das Art und AusmaB der Entschadigung
regelt. Die Entschadigung ist unter gerechter Abwagung der Interessen der
Allgemeinheit unter der Beteiligten zu bestimmen. Wegen der Hohe der Entschadigung
steht im Streitfalle der Rechtsweg vor den ordentlichen Gerichten offen." Grundgesetz,
supra note 16, at art. 14(3). ["An expropriation is only permissible if for the welfare of
the Community. It may only occur through legislation or on the basis of a law that
regulates type and degree of compensation. Compensation is to be determined under a
just weighing of the interests of the community and of those involved. Regarding the
degree of compensation, parties can take legal action before a court of full jurisdiction
in case of a dispute."] [Author's translation].
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It is fair to say that this holding clarifies the German notion of
Property in some respects but muddies the waters elsewhere. Specific-
ally, for our purposes it clarifies to a degree how the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht interprets these boundaries, but it also makes clear those
boundaries are fungible. This naturally leads to questions as to how
mutable one's property rights are under German law. If the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht can hold that a new municipal law modifying those
rights can be judged appropriate, then what is to stop that property
right from being whittled down over time to a meaningless nub for the
individual? 24 It is a fair question, and underscores the fact that Article
14 creates an unusual constitutional flexibility in terms of property, so
that what is a property right now may not be a property right later if
society's fundamental needs change.25 The Bundesverfassungsgericht's
sense of where property's constitutional limits ("Schranken") lie is
further illustrated in the following case relating to government
benefits.
The BVerfG specifically held that the "constitutional guarantee of ownership exercised
by the plaintiff does not imply that a property interest, once recognized, would have to
be preserved in perpetuity or that it could be taken away only by way of expropriation
(i.e., with compensation). [This Court] has repeatedly ruled that the legislature is not
faced with the alternative of either preserving old legal positions or taking them away
in exchange for compensation every time an area of law is to be regulated anew."
Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German
Example, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 761 (2002-2003); see also BVerfG 58, 300 (301)
(1981).
24 "Ohne Eigentumsgarantie bleiben dem Bilrger nur "nutzlose Freiheiten",...
Seit zwei Jahrhunderten findet um das Privateigentum, vor allem in
Deutschland, die heftigsten Verfassungskiimpfe der Neuzeit statt, nirgends ist
der Rechtskonsens so gering wie hier-in den Einzelheiten, den Problemen
des eigentlichen Eigentums." [Without a Property guarantee, the citizen is
left only with "useless freedoms" ... For two centuries, the most heated con-
stitutional fights of modem times have taken place over private property,
above all in Germany; nowhere is the consensus as to this right as small as it
is here-in the details, the problems of property at its core.] [Author's
translation].
JOSEF ISENSEE, FANDBUCH DES STAATRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSHLAND
302 (Paul Kirchhof ed., 8th vol.)
25 Lubens, supra note 19, at 412.
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2. The Eigenleistung Case
The Eigenleistung ("Individual Performance") case shows another
contour of the balancing required by Article 14. In that case, a federal
statute motivated by budget concerns reduced some of the govern-
ment health insurance benefits received by the elderly. 26 A group of
those affected filed a claim that this reduction constituted a taking that
"deprived them of a property interest that was essential to their per-
sonal liberty." 27 The Bundesverfassungsgericht held that these benefits -
and their reduction -did not constitute a property interest in that the
interests were merely received and not earned by the singular efforts of
the individual ("die Eigenleistung").28 The court held that the threshold
of Eigenleistung could be reached through contribution- for example,
to a 401k-but it would not apply to benefits received from the state,
even if the recipients were taxpayers, contributing in effect their taxes
to that benefit. Again, the Bundesverfassungsgericht struggled to find the
limits of that property right, but it stressed that fundamental in its
decision was its understanding of "the core constitutional function of
property as providing the material security ... for both human dignity
and civic self-governance." 29 Ultimately, while the German courts
struggled to articulate the balance between the individual and the
collective, the European Courts were similarly struggling to under-
stand and clarify property rights. This property right evolution will be
addressed in the next section.
III. EUROPEAN CHARTERS
A. Formation of the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR)
The European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR) and its
appointed Court, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), was
established directly after the Second World War, and was viewed
largely by European states as a way to give enforcement authority in
Europe to the U.N.'s unanimously approved but non-binding Univer-
26 Gregory S. Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The
German Example, 88 CoRNELL L. REv. 733, 765 (2002-2003).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 766.
29 Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
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sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).3o European States felt
strongly that without an enforcement mechanism, the enthusiasms for
these rights, derived from fresh experiences of their denial, would fade
and be vulnerable to marginalization over the long term.31
Although this Charter was in formation at roughly the same
time as the German Grundgesetz, it is fair to presume the drafters of the
ECHR Charter took few cues on human rights from the Grundgesetz, as
the German State at that time had little credibility or moral authority
on that front.32 As we will see, over time this approach by the ECHR
would serve its human rights interests less than ideally, particularly in
regard to the issue of Property.
The ECHR notion of Property as a human right was fraught
with other political issues as well.33 While issues such as the abolition
30 ANDREA BIRDSALL, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION:
CREATING A MORE JUST ORDER 45 (2009). As stated: "the Declaration [UDHR] does
not constitute binding law for the states that signed it, but is merely a 'statement of
aspirations' (Forsythe 2006: 39) which outlines only very general duties to promote
human rights standards. There is no legal duty to comply with the UDHR's standards
and no independent enforcement mechanism is attached to it. It is a declaration only,
rather than a treaty or Convention, primarily aimed at raising human rights conscious-
ness around the world." Id.
3 1 Id.
32 For a compelling analysis of the development of human rights in terms of the
interplay between European State Constitutions and the broader European Treaties and
Declarations, see Arnold, supra note 11, at 45. Specifically Arnold divides the Euro-
pean Constitutional Development into 3 phases and characterizes the first as the courts:
"The first phase lasts from the late forties to the late sixties when post-war constitu-
tions, such as the Italian and in particular the German, are establishing systems which
embody the new orientation ... by attributing highest importance to human values and
fundamental rights. In this first period one tendency that particularly advances matters
is already apparent: this is the internationalization of the individual's protection which
began with the universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and led in 1950 to the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) within the Council of Europe. The
second phase takes place ... in reaction to totalitarian regimes. "These Constitutions
take over the progressive elements of the German Constitution as shaped by the juris-
prudence of the Constitutional Court.... This is the ideological background and
conceptual basis of the European Union Fundamental Rights Charter. Thus, it is an
instrument built upon the continuous development of Constitutional Law described
above. As a consequence, the Charter is a homogenous instrument with an updated
standard." Id.
33 A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLs, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (1993).
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of torture, freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly all made their
way into the first articles of the ECHR, the right of property was a
more delicate matter and did not in the end make it in to the first
Articles of the Charter. 34 While some have argued that this absence of a
property right was a signal failure, others have contended that the
omission was instead nothing more than a trifle of procedure in that
the Committee of Ministers involved in the decision merely needed
more time to address the matter satisfactorily for all relevant parties.
Instead, the Committee considered it more politically expedient to
move forward with the agreed articles, without the Property Article
included, while the political climate was still strongly favorable.35
The primary cause for delay in articulating the Property right
was the concern as to how to strike the appropriate balance between
the public interest and private right-again to reframe, between the
collective and the individual. As stated by Robertson and Merrill: "it
was a matter of some delicacy to draft a clause which would permit a
democratic government to nationalize private property 'in accordance
with the general interest,' but which would not allow a totalitarian
government to adopt policies of confiscation contrary to the rights of
individuals and the values of a free society." 36 In the end, this right
would be included as Article 1 of Protocol 1, the following year.
Unlike Article 14 of the Grundgesetz, the ECHR Article on
Property does not come with a guarantee but instead the promise of
"entitlement to the peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions." 37 This is
followed by a statement of the right for governments to take property
provided it serves the public interest.38 It is important to underscore
the fundamental difference from the formulation of the Grundgesetz
here: the ECHR articulation does not speak to the individual's
responsibility to the State but, rather, articulates these rights from the
34 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm for the full list
of the Articles.
35 ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 14, at 11.36 
d
37 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 33, at Protocol 1, Art. I.
3 Id. ("No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.").
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State perspective, and the State's right to expropriate, provided it can
adequately articulate its need. Article 1 of the ECHR then follows with
a second sentence that further affirms the State's right to expropriate
land or implement taxes.39 As fundamental human rights go, its articu-
lation leans significantly more to the State's interests than the
Grundgesetz's Article 14, and its tenor reflects the political forces-
particularly the strong need to include Socialist countries-at play at
the time.
Over the long term, however, time would show that the
ECHR's articulation of the property right would not be the only supra-
national judicial effort. The ECJ, the judicial arm of the EU, would also
find itself addressing human rights issues, despite its lack of
addressing these issues in its initial Charter. The Germans, while
initially lacking moral suasion in the human rights conversation, in this
court would show a dogged commitment to the issue over time,
pressuring that body steadily to establish a more codified and power-
ful human rights stance. It would seem their collective experience
seared into their souls a particularly powerful commitment to never
see the individual violated in this way again. We will therefore
address, in the next section, the overall formation of the European
Union along with the various German influences that helped propel
the EU to create a Charter of Fundamental Human Rights-particu-
larly in terms of the right to property.
B. Formation of the European Union
The current European Union (EU) began as the European Coal
and Steel Community in 1952 to help the shattered economies of
member States recover,40 through the removal of barriers impeding a
strong collective economy.41 As successful as the EU proved in
39 Id ("The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.").
40 EU treaties, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index en.
htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014); for a fuller analysis of the degree to which the
European economies were compromised, see JUDT, supra note 6, at 13-40.
41 LAMMY BETTEN & NICHOLAs GPJEF, EU LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTs 53 (1998); see
also JUDT, supra note 6, at 129-64 (Judt has persuasively argued further that this was
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advancing the economic prosperity of the continent, an abiding con-
cern developed relating to the EU's absence of a codified charter for
human rights. Issues relating to property were often at the center of
such disputes. This should come as no surprise, given that judicial
decisions relating to property frequently can have effects on an
economic as well as on a human rights level. As the ECJ's charter and
documents fundamentally lacked text regarding human rights
considerations, the court found itself at times ham-fistedly attempting
to address these issues, unable to do so with compelling judicial
authority. As will soon be seen, German influence would directly and
indirectly move the ECJ to resolve this shortcoming.
How the Germans influenced the ECJ would develop in a
variety of ways. For example, from a more indirect and organic per-
spective, the ECJ was influenced by the Grundgesetz' influence on other
State constitutions. Because the ECJ is a European institution, it has an
interest in harmonizing, as much as possible, with its constituent State
Constitutions.42 While the German Grundgesetz and the holdings of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht alone may not hold great influence in the
aggregate of European States, that influence naturally increases when
emerging democratic countries in Europe-such as Portugal, Spain,
and Greece-look in part to the Grundgesetz to articulate their own
State Constitutions as they emerged from their dictatorships. 43 As this
occurred, the German Grundgesetz increased its supranational influ-
ence organically with these additional like-minded Constitutions.
Perhaps in somewhat of a backward fashion, the Germans
would also influence the court through specific cases, most notably
through its own human rights missteps in the case of Stauder.44 Stauder
dealt with an EU directive for distributing surplus butter to those in
an effort to get France and West Germany to work together and understand they were
essential to the prosperity of one another. This was difficult to do in the wake of the
mistrust of France following the Second World War, but understood by France
particularly as crucial in light of their economy and recent political events).
42 Arnold, supra note 11, at 46.
43 As Arnold states, "in the seventies ... [n]ew approaches are taken in the Greek, the
Spanish and the Portuguese Constitutions as reactions to the former totalitarian regimes
in these countries. These constitutions [took] over the progressive elements of the
German Constitution [Grundgesetz] as shaped by the jurisprudence of the Constitu-
tional Court [Bundesverfassungsgericht]." Id.
44 Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm-Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 29/69 p. 419.
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more straitened circumstances. The European legislative directive
required, however, a reliable mechanism to accurately identify those
truly in need.45 The statute, as subsequently transposed into German
law, required applicants to identify themselves by name, rather than
by number or card, before receiving the supplemental butter.46
Stauder, who was qualified to receive the butter, objected, arguing that
disclosure of his actual name was a violation of his human rights, in
effect, a humiliating exposure of his compromised means.47 The Court
held that the EU statute required only some manner of identification
and, therefore, identification by name was not necessary. Accordingly,
the Court directed the German legislature to adjust its language. 48
The Stauder case was a landmark decision given its surprising
holding-i.e. that human rights laws as established under the ECHR
and under case law of the ECtHR had become General Principles of
Law, and could therefore serve as binding authority for future ECJ
decisions. 49 Such a holding may seem less remarkable to those familiar
with common law traditions, in which judges develop the fuller
texture of laws through their holdings. However, for European States
that operate predominantly under civil law systems, judges holding
that case law has precedential weight was a bit revolutionary. This
move, however, may have been motivated in part by expedience and
frustration, for the court needed some text to work from regarding
human rights-and with this holding they now had it.50 Here, how-
ever, German law advanced the European Human Rights cause by its
inappropriate transposition of the EU butter directive, advancing the
human rights mission of the ECJ effectively through its own
ungainliness.
German influence on the ECJ, however, would be perhaps
hardest pressed by the German courts in what are commonly termed
the Solange ("so long as") cases. In these cases, following standard ECJ
45 BETTEN & GRIEF, supra note 40, at 56.
46 Strauder, supra note 43.
47 It is ironic that in his efforts to secure his anonymity, Stander's straitened circum-
stances ultimately became all the more bruited, at least in circles of European jurispru-
dence, than ever would have been the case had he not fought for greater anonymity.
48 Strauder, supra note 43.
49 BETTEN & GRIEF, supra note 40, at 56.
'0 Id. at 57.
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procedure, a lower German Court referred a question to the ECJ asking
whether the German courts must still deem provisions in EU statutes
valid and enforceable if they violate principles of its own Grundgesetz.51
The ECJ responded that in the interests of uniformity, EU law must
prevail and violations of German constitutional principles would need
to be set aside by the German courts in such cases. Needless to say, this
did not sit well with the lower German court, which duly passed the
ECJ holding on to its highest court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht responded, in turn, that because
fundamental human rights served as a core principle for the Grund-
gesetz, as long as the EU lacked a democratic parliament and a codified
catalogue of its own fundamental human rights, the EU could not hold
title to legal certainty in regard to human rights, and the German
Constitutional Court, not the EU, would therefore determine whether
EU law was compatible with German law. 52 The Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, in effect challenged the ECJ to move to a higher bar in securing
fundamental rights, underscoring the failure of the ECJ to establish a
codified text regarding human rights.53 From this decision -along with
similar concerns expressed over time by the Italian courts as well -it
became clear to the ECJ that the use of General Principles over codified
legislation would not suffice long-term, and the EU would move
slowly but inexorably towards the creation of its own codified Charter
of Fundamental Rights (CFR).
To address this shortcoming, a commission was ultimately put
together, and here again German influence would be prominent. While
51 Id. at 64; see also Internationale Handlesgesel/schaft mbH v. EinJhurund Vorrats-
stelle fir Getreide undFuttermittel 1974 C.M.L.R. 11/70.
52 BETTEN & GRIEF, supra note 40, at 65; see also Internationale supra note 50
("although the [German] Constitutional Court could not rule on the validity or
otherwise of a rule of Community law, it could declare such a rule to be inapplicable in
Germany if fundamental rights were violated.").
53 The Bananas case also articulated forcefully the Bundesverfassungsgericht's
position as it related to the ECJ. As Weatherill summarized the holding in that case, the
court stated: "The Bundesverfassungsgericht does not concede to the European Court
an exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the validity of Community law.... It maintains an
ultimate review of competence vested in the German court in the event that review of
EC acts against the standards of fundamental rights by the European Court is shown to
be deficient judged by German constitutional standards. But it places a heavy burden
on the applicant seeking to demonstrate such deficiency." STEPHEN WEATHERILL,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EU LAw 667 (2007).
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the members of the commission were principally representatives from
the various parliaments of the member states, the entire commission
was headed by Roman Herzog, the former German Federal President
and the former Chief Justice of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the highest
position of the German Constitutional Court).54
The German influence on the Charter through Roman Herzog
would be substantial.55 This is apparent from the title itself, the Charter
of Fundamental Rights, a coining familiar to Germans through the
Grundgesetz but less so to other State Constitutions.56 The fundamental
nature of the document as well shows a German influence in the
specificity of its written guarantees rather than being a looser, less
codified approach more reminiscent of France or Britain.57 Further-
more, the very beginning bespeaks Grundgesetz influence: Article 1 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union is, as in the
Grundgesetz, Human Dignity.58
The Charter also carries with it a fundamental property right,
through Article 17, whose language follows closely that of Protocol I,
Article I of the ECHR.59 That the articulation of this right followed the
ECHR's formulation of that right is somewhat unfortunate from a
property rights perspective. As shown in the ECHR's original consi-
derations in drafting the property right, it was concerned with
providing sufficient state expropriation rights in order to be as inviting
as possible to socialist countries. That is to say, as much as the ECHR
was grounded in human rights, in terms of Property it was at the time
politically expedient to insist less on that private right. The Grundgesetz
54 Amold, supra note 11, at 45.
5s It is important to be clear in the final analysis that for all of the influence from the
Grundgesetz and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Charter of Fundamental Rights
received more influence from the ECHR than any other text or institution. Perhaps
nowhere is that stated more explicitly than in Article 52, Paragraph 3, which states "In
so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said
[ECHR] Convention." See infra note 60.
56 Arnold, supra note 11, at 50.
5 7Id
s Id. at 54.
59 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2007) (C 303/23), available at http://
eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:FULL:EN:PDF; see
also Arnold, supra note 11, at 56.
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formulation, on the other hand, was motivated by no such political
forces, and its text provided it could go so far as to guarantee
("gewahrleisten") Property to the individual.
The lack of German influence on the articulation of property in
the CFR may not at first appear overly problematic. Article 14's
articulation is, after all, unorthodox and so would have been a less
conventional choice. Furthermore, it is the ECHR that is officially
charged with protecting human rights, and so the CFR's choice of the
ECHR's text would seem reasonable from this perspective as well.60
Finally, one might argue that even if this property right is not articula-
ted ideally by the CFR, one need not be overly concerned because the
ECJ is not the final arbiter on human rights.
However, other underlying concerns nettle. First of all, it is
important to remember that while the ECHR is charged with human
rights, the property right as written in its origin had political concerns
that led to an articulation particularly favorable to state interests.
Secondly, the ECJ has had something of a woeful track record relating
to property, having not decided a single case against its own legisla-
tion in that area,61 so striking a balance that advocated more for the
individual would have seemed, on the contrary, all the more urgently
needed for that court. But perhaps most problematic, as we will see in
the next section, is that, due to procedure, it is not entirely clear if it is
indeed the ECtHR which has the final authority in adjudging whether
a human right has been violated when economic interests are involved.
IV. UNDERSTANDING PROCEDURE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
While the ECJ has long toiled to find its north star as related to
fundamental human rights, the ECtHR has struggled in turn to find a
way to harmonize its jurisdiction with the ECJ. The fact that both
60 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 52 3; for the implica-
tions of this connection, see Thomas Von Danwitz, The Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union between Political Symbolism and Legal Realism, 29
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 289, 301 (2000-2001).
61 Von Danwitz, supra note 60, at 294. As Danwitz noted: "[c]ompared to the high
number of verdicts from national constitutional courts over national legislation
regulating property rights and professional liberty, this practice raised doubts over the
effectiveness of judicial review exercised by the ECJ."
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courts are supra-national leads to the inevitable question: which court
has ultimate authority? This is fairly straightforward when the issue is
purely economic or human rights-related, but it becomes murkier
when the two issues are entangled, something that occurs with parti-
cular frequency over issues relating to property. In such cases, a
human rights advocate would rightly express concern if the ECJ were
to have final authority over human rights issues, as that court's
primary concern is economic. However, problems equally arise for the
ECJ's judicial sovereignty in exercising its jurisdiction and authority if
the ECtHR could readily overrule it on human rights grounds.
To understand how the two courts work with each other, it is
of fundamental importance to understand the distinct procedure of the
two courts. The ECtHR process is fairly straightforward and familiar to
those in appeals systems in that the applicant appeals a decision from
the lower court, generally, the relevant State's highest court. That
ECtHR appeal is eligible for review if it satisfies four basic require-
ments: (1) all state remedies have been exhausted (generally, again,
meaning appeal has failed at the State's highest court); (2) the appeal
comes within six months of the exhaustion of those State remedies;
(3) the appeal states a valid claim; and, more recently, (4) the appeal
satisfies a de minimis requirement.62
The ECJ, on the other hand, serves more of a consultative role
in relation to the State courts. All European State courts may, and
highest State courts must, consult the ECJ for advisory opinions as to
issues that they deem may relate to EU legislation and the EU body.63
The ECJ will return its opinion to that court, stating its opinion on that
issue alone, rather than the entire case. The relevant State court will
then pass along its final decision in light of the ECJ's opinion.
This naturally leads to the possibility that a plaintiff could
appeal a case that has an ECJ opinion within it to the ECtHR, which
would suggest that the ECtHR is hierarchically above the ECJ.
However, the two judicial bodies have collaborated extensively to
62 For the full list of relevant eligibility requirements, see http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Admissibility-guide ENG.pdf.
63 See THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 199 (Grainne De Burca & J. H. H. Weiler
eds., 2001) (adding further clarification of this process and a comparison with the U.S.
system).
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prevent any such jurisdictional clashes from occurring.64 To this end,
for example, the ECtHr developed the "equivalent protection" doc-
trine, whereby it held that cases would be inadmissible in the ECtHR if
"equivalent protection" had already been provided in other courts6
The argument is that such a policy allows for harmonization in that it
"allows the ECtHR to accommodate the autonomy of the EU legal
order, whilst encouraging, if not inducing, compliance with ECHR
standards by the ECJ."6 6 The ECtHR has used this doctrine consider-
ably to avoid coming into conflict or giving closer scrutiny to ECJ
decisions, tending where possible to find applications inadmissible for
other reasons.67
While the effort at harmonization is laudable, it raises
problematic possibilities in terms of human rights. As constructed, it
means the ECtHR will make every effort to accommodate ECJ
opinions, and yet as human rights are only a subsidiary concern of the
ECJ, from a human rights perspective this would seem wrongly
ordered. As has been noted, there is a compelling argument that the
ECJ should receive no such deferential treatment from the ECtHR in
relation to human rights because of its questionable track record on
human rights issues. As Joseph Phelps argues, "[i]t has not protected
these fundamental rights for their own sake [and] has not taken these
rights seriously." 68 Instead, by giving the ECJ such deferential treat-
64 Frank Hoffmeister, European Convention on Human Rights Reviewability of
National Actions to Implement EU Law-Impounding Aircraft-Right to Property, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 442, 447 (April 2006) ("This question inescapably involves a delicate
policy issue between the ECHR and the EC. If the ECHR were to fully review an EC
act, it would, in effect, be putting itself in a hierarchically superior position over the
ECJ-a court that is, by design, intended to have exclusive competence over matters of
EC law. But if it accepted that human rights standards were protected by EC law in
exemplary fashion so as to make an additional layer of judicial control unnecessary,
the ECHR would then be reviewing only particular human rights cases from the
highest courts in the member states-and not cases from the ECJ. In much the same
manner as had been done by the German Constitutional Court....").
65 Cathryn Costello, The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights:




68 Joseph Phelps, Reflections on Bosphorus and Human Rights in Europe, 81 TUL. L.
REv. 251, 276 (2006-2007).
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ment, the ECtHR has elevated "free market freedoms guaranteed in
the Community treaties to a status equivalent to that of fundamental
human rights."69 As a result, "because the ECJ's goal is economic inte-
gration, at times fundamental rights will have to be cast aside to
achieve the community's goal, and due to the ECtHR's posture vis-A-
vis the ECJ, that former body will be substantially constrained to
accommodate those decisions."70
However, deference by the ECtHR to the ECJ would occur not
only by way of the "equivalent protection" doctrine. Giving still
further weight to ECJ decisions in human rights, the ECtHR would
articulate also the "manifestly deficient" policy through its holding in
Bosphorus, a considerably celebrated and controversial case which we
will address in the next section.
V. THE BOSPHORUS CASES
A. BOSPHORUS (ECJ)
In the Bosphorus case, Bosphorus, a Turkish airline, leased
airplanes from Yugoslavia, a country that was at that time fully
submerged in the ravages of civil war. To encourage the end of that
civil war, the European Union issued a directive restricting all EU
countries from doing business with Yugoslavia until peace had been
re-established. To abide by this directive, the Turkish airline paid for
their leasing of the airplanes by putting money in an account that had
been frozen. However, when one of the Yugoslavian-leased airplanes
landed in Ireland, the Irish Minister of Transportation had the airplane
grounded, deeming the Turkish-Yugoslavian transaction a violation of
the EU directive.
The Turkish airline then duly filed a complaint, claiming that
Ireland's seizing and grounding of their airplanes, leased from the
Former Republic of Yugoslavia, was an inappropriate interpretation of
the EU's directive to suspend all commerce with the Former Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Macedonia).71 The design of the directive
69 Id
7 Id.
71 Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for
Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland and the Attorney General 8, 1996
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was to apply economic pressure to end that Country's civil war (and
was implemented following UN Security Resolutions to the same
effect). 72 Following ECJ procedure, the complaining party filed in the
allegedly offending State's Court (Ireland).
The Irish Supreme Court took the issue of how this EU
directive was to be implemented to the ECJ for clarification. The ECJ in
turn issued an advisory opinion that Ireland had correctly imple-
mented the initiative,73 whereupon the Irish Supreme Court ruled that
Irish Department of Transportation had acted appropriately in
grounding the Turkish airplane. While the ECJ was merely inter-
preting EU legislation, it was nonetheless dramatically affecting an
individual property right.
B. BOSPHORUS (ECTHR)
The Bosphorus Airlines in due course then took the Irish
Supreme Court decision to the ECtHR, no longer asking for whether
Ireland had appropriately interpreted the EU provision, but instead
now alleging that the statute, as such, constituted a violation of their
basic human right to property, under Protocol 1, Article I of the
European Charter of Human Rights.
The ECtHR noted that property was indeed an inalienable
human right but that it did not come without obligation to the larger
community, here, the European Union.74 The ECtHR held that the fact
E.C.R., available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
61995CJ0084:EN:PDF.
72 d
73 As stated with characteristic ECJ efficiency: "Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 990/93 of 26 April 1993 concerning trade between the European Economic
Community and the [FRY] applies to an aircraft which is owned by an undertaking
based in or operating from the [FRY], even though the owner has leased it for four
years to another undertaking, neither based in nor operating from [the FRY] and in
which no person or undertaking based in or operating from [the FRY] has a majority or
controlling interest." Case C-84/96 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the
Supreme Court of Ireland): Case C-336/24, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret
AS v. Minister for Trasnport, Energy and Communications, Ireland and the Attorney
General, 1996 E.C.R.
74 Case C-84/95 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of Ireland):
Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport, Energy and
Communications, Ireland and the Attorney General. (96/C 336/24) 30 July 1996.
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that the burden on the small Turkish Airline was unfortunate, but it
was judged a burden not too onerous for an individual to bear, given
the directive's larger social aim of pressuring for peace in Yugoslavia.
Here, the individual sacrifice for the common good was enormous,
however, devastating the business of the Turkish airline, and setting an
unsettlingly high standard for what a physical or moral person must
economically be burdened with before their loss may be considered
compensable.
However, of more lasting concern was the Court's assertion
regarding its judicial relationship with the ECJ, stating that it would
not counter decisions made by that judicial body unless they were
"manifestly deficient", an exceedingly high threshold for a plaintiff to
meet.75 A question in terms of this case and others naturally follows -
would the ECtHR have made such a holding against the Turkish
Airline if the opinion of the ECJ had not been intertwined? In short,
was the ECtHR effectively no longer the de facto highest court for
human rights when economic questions were involved?
The case itself has been considered to be one of the darker
moments for the ECtHR. The fact that the Turkish company had paid
their money into a frozen account that could therefore not benefit
Yugoslavia in any way at the time seemed to many as offering Yugo-
slavia no war-time benefit, and so the denial of Bosphorus' property
seemed excessive. The contrary holding struck many as heavy-handed
in that it seemed to do little more than "deprive an apparently
innocent party of the benefit of its property."7 6 Some have gone
further, arguing that "the assessment of the justification of the property
rights infringement was so deferential to the foreign policy objective
being pursued that it entailed 'no serious balancing test' and
'expressed an almost total indifference to the way the Community
organs exercised their discretion in the political-foreign affairs sphere
when implementing the Resolution'."7
7 App. No. 45036/98, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland 156, 2005 Eur. Ct.
H.R. available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#("fulltext":
["Bosphorus"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"ite
mid":["001-69564"].




Ultimately, however, the failure here to balance public interests
and private rights relating to property brings to the foreground the
magnitude of the lost opportunity of importing the special German
conceit of property to the CFR. To have wholly adopted instead the
ECHR's Article on property, an article that was written as more of a
political calculation with State interests in mind, than a careful
balancing of rights, is unfortunate. For all of Germany's documented
success in influencing the European courts on their human rights
issues, and for all of the German influence present at that crucial
textual decision point, the absence of a more balanced property right,
such as that found in Article 14, is manifest and most unfortunate,
particularly given the "manifestly deficient" deferential holding of the
ECtHR.78
VI. CONCLUSION
The German influence on the EU's addressing of human rights
has been substantial, from dramatically effecting ECJ jurisprudence, to
pressing for an EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, and even to the
leadership of Roman Herzog in drafting the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. However, an irksome question remains: due to the ECHR's
early concession to socialist governments in the drafting of the proper-
ty right and the subsequent virtual wholesale importation of that
ECHR language to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, one wonders
whether a singular opportunity for German influence was lost by the
failure to import, or at least consider, some part of Article 14 of the
Grundgesetz in articulating the CFR's right to property. That Roman
Herzog oversaw the creation of the CFR shows that real German
influence and German constitutional knowledge was present at the
table, and therefore, that such a hope was not unrealistic.
Counter-arguments to this concern have been duly raised,
generally focusing on the limited scope of such a possibility. The ECJ
jurisdiction applies after all to only twenty-eight countries, while the
ECtHR applies to forty-eight. ECJ jurisdiction furthermore applies only
to citizens of the EU, while ECtHR jurisdiction applies to anyone,
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citizen or other, on the territory of a signatory to the ECHR. Further-
more, ECJ decisions will necessarily have to first include the violation
or infringement of some basic economic right, and then will only be
charged to address human rights, if one should also be intertwined.
Yet many remain concerned and note "growing evidence that the
European Union (EU) is becoming more involved in human rights
protection and has the capacity to turn into an unprecedented post-
national human rights protection institution." 79 This statement in 2006
has all the more resonance in 2014, following the EU's ratification in
Lisbon of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2010. Specifically in
terms of property rights at the European level, given the abysmal track
record of the ECJ in adjudicating overwhelmingly against private right
interests, it is all the more unfortunate that the unique articulation of
property rights found in Article 14 of the Grundgesetz, did not in any
measure get to serve as a voice for the balance of public interest and
private right in the adjudicative process at the supra-national
European level.
79 Samantha Besson, The European Union and Human Rights: Towards a Post-
National Human Rights Institution?, 6 HuM. RTs. L. REv. 323 (2006) (emphasis
added).
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